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Abstract
In this paper, I present additional information for policy-makers and researchers to consider in response to 
the view proposed by Potts et al that “the pill is mightier than the sword.” I identify states with both high 
rates of terrorism and a youth bulge and discuss correlates of both these societal characteristics. The research 
examined supports the view that factors other than access to family planning are more important in facilitating 
terrorism. 
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My initial reaction to the Potts et al1 hypothesis that the “pill is mightier than the sword” was disbelief. Do the authors really mean to imply that recent 
terrorist tragedies could have been prevented if women 
in those countries were able to practice effective fertility 
control? What about the ease of access to modern weapons 
or the influence of media in inspiring youth to join terrorist 
movements and kill others or the well-publicized violations of 
human rights due to policies of countries such as the United 
States and Israel? 
To examine the hypothesis that the pill is mightier than the 
sword, I found indicators of both terrorism and the youth 
bulge. Demographers have often stated that a youth bulge 
provides evidence for a lack of access to family planning 
services and a high fertility rate. I also looked at research that 
investigated significant correlates of both terrorism and a 
youth bulge. According to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index 
(GTI) scores,2 countries with the highest 10 scores accounted 
for 90% of global terrorist attacks. The top 10 terrorist 
countries in 2014 with their terrorist score in parentheses 
were Iraq (10), Afghanistan (9.39), Pakistan (9.37), Nigeria 
(8.58), Syria (8.12), India (7.7), Somalia (7.41), Yemen (7.31), 
the Philippines (7.29), and Thailand (7.19). Terrorist scores 
were computed for 162 countries and values ranged from 0 
to 10. The 4 weighted components of the GTI were number 
of yearly terrorists incidents, number of fatalities caused by 
terrorist incidents, number of injuries, and approximation of 
property damage. 
Countries with a median age substantially lower than the 
global median age are classified as those with a youth bulge. 
The World Factbook3 reports that the global median age is 
29.7 and also gives the 2014 median age of countries of the 
world. Research4 provides some support for the view that 
younger populations tend to engage in more violence than 
older populations. This statement is, of course, consistent with 
the “pill-sword” hypothesis. Also supporting this hypothesis 
is that nine of the ten 2014 highest terrorist countries have 
a median age less than the global median age, with Somalia 
having the lowest (17.7) and the Philippines the highest (23.5). 
Buddhist Thailand stands out among the other 10 countries 
in being classified as a high terrorist country with a median 
age of 36.2 and thus no youth bulge. 
Part of my argument in questioning the “pill-sword” 
hypothesis is its simplicity. I have always rejected ideas that 
emphasize only one factor as a major cause of any major 
societal phenomenon. Countries with the highest rates of 
terrorism have many common characteristics that likely also 
contribute to these high rates. Some of these characteristics 
also inhibit the ability of women to control their fertility. 
For example, the high terrorist countries all had high gender 
inequality indices according to the 2014 Human Development 
Report5 that ranked countries from 1 to 152. For this index, 
both the Philippines (78) and Thailand (70) had lower gender 
inequality indices than the other high terrorist countries 
(range of 120 to 152); no index number was given for the 
Somalia or Nigeria. In patriarchal countries, women have 
low autonomy and would likely not have the skills or power 
to exercise their right to control their fertility. Abadian6 
examined the relationship between female autonomy 
(measured by female age of first marriage, age difference 
between husband and wife and female education) and fertility 
rate for 54 less developed countries. Lower age of female 
marriage, greater age difference between husband and wife 
and lower female education were all highly and significantly 
correlated with higher fertility rates. 
High terrorist countries also have many characteristics of a 
fragile state such as group grievance, poor public services, 
violations of human rights and ineffective security.7 The 
2015 Fragile State Index is composed of 12 indicators that in 
turn are made up of more than 80 measures. One indicator, 
demographic pressures, is made up of 10 measures that 
include a youth bulge and population growth. My question for 
Potts et al1 is why they singled out the youth bulge when other 
societal conditions might be more important in facilitating 
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terrorism. Further, there are many countries that have a youth 
bulge, more characteristics of failed states, and low gender 
equality but have little terrorist violence. So, what are the 
societal factors and mechanisms that promote terrorism? 
The top 10 terrorist states that are predominantly Muslim or 
with a substantial Muslim population were also among the 
top 14 of the worst fragile states of the 178 states ranked. 
The fragile state ranking of the high terrorist non-Muslim 
countries, the Philippines, India, and Thailand, were 48, 68, 
and 71, respectively.7 Iman8 emphasizes that basic tenets of 
the Muslim religious right focus on women and the need to 
restrict their roles to that of wife and mother and to support 
customs that lower their autonomy. Iman also states that 
Muslim religious rights groups frequently work to limit family 
planning methods. If those in power promote such views of 
women, it seems unlikely that they would have the autonomy 
necessary to control their fertility. However, in addition, Iman 
acknowledges that some Muslim countries like Iran have 
supported contraceptive use, and there is little in Muslim law 
that supports strong restrictions on birth control. 
I do not mean to single out Islam as the only religion that 
disempowers women. Iman stresses that most religious right 
movements of all religions share a number of characteristics 
that limit the rights of women. Indeed, in the United States, 
the Christian religious right has worked and continues to work 
to make birth control and family planning services difficult or 
impossible to access. Those in power in many countries today 
and historically often use religion as a way to maintain their 
control over laws and customs.
To add to the discussion of religion, consider the case of 
Thailand, the country with the 10th highest terrorist index. 
Potts et al1 highlight Thailand as having a low fertility rate 
and access to family planning for decades. I believe this access 
was promoted by its support from the dominant religion, 
Buddhism. So the question is: if there is family planning in this 
high terrorist country, what other factors need consideration 
as causes? We cannot attribute the terrorism of Thailand to a 
“youth bulge.”
I do not agree with Potts et al1 that improving family 
planning and the education of girls education are the “most 
amenable to change from a human rights perspective” or that 
“influential economists and development strategists” have 
been unaware that “family size falls when women have the 
knowledge and means to separate sexual intercourse from 
childbearing.” These views seems to imply that improving 
family planning and girls’ education are easy to bring about 
and that policy-makers have not understood the family 
planning needs of women. However, improving access to 
basic healthcare including family planning and the education 
of girls have been priorities of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the 
World Association of Sexual Health (WAS) as well as human 
rights advocates, health professionals, and feminists for 
decades. A 2014 publication,9 for example, emphasizes that 
225 million women in developing countries want to avoid 
pregnancy but lack modern contraceptives. So, this need is 
widely acknowledged and has been for some time, especially 
since the two watershed conferences, the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development10 and the 1995 
Fourth World Conference on Women.11 At these conferences, 
both Christian and Muslim delegates lobbied hard to limit the 
sexual and reproductive rights of women, and this opposition 
continues to be a major barrier in much of the world. In 
addition to religion, the task of improving family planning 
and the education of girls faces other substantial barriers. 
One common theme that relates to the control by women 
of their fertility links this control to their power in the 
institutions of society. Where women are valued and have 
respected roles in the political, economic, religious, familial, 
and education institutions their sexual and reproductive 
rights will be greater than where such roles are minimal.12,13 
Others have stated this in somewhat different terms: Women 
have more reproductive and sexual freedom in societies 
where mothers receive help in the care of their children, 
where women have important economic and political roles, 
where the military has a minor role, and where women play 
an important part of the societal mythology and religion.14 
All the aforementioned factors need to be addressed for the 
autonomy and empowerment of women to increase and 
thereby facilitate their fertility control. I do agree with Potts 
et al1 that in states where women are educated, empowered, 
and have access to family planning and other healthcare, 
conditions supporting terrorist acts would likely be less. 
As stated above, all the high terrorist countries also are 
characterized by low empowerment of women. 
The strongest arguments against Potts et al1 come from a 
publication of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).2 
Contributors to this work examined many variables for the 
strength of their relationship to the GTI. They found the 3 
most significant correlates of terrorist events to be political 
instability, lack of intergroup cohesion, and weak legitimacy of 
the state. Other significant correlates were safety and security, 
militarization, ongoing conflict, external and internal peace, 
level of organized and violent crime, and likelihood of violent 
demonstrations. To the surprise of researchers, there were 
no significant correlations of poverty, life expectancy, years 
of schooling or gross domestic product to terrorist events. 
Their explanation for these weak relationships was that there 
were so many low terrorist countries that also scored poorly 
on these measures of human development. The main drivers 
of terrorism were political or nationalistic and independence 
movements, and in the some parts of the Middle East, South 
Asia and sub-Saharan African religious ideologies were cited 
as a motivation for terrorism.
It is noteworthy that youth bulge was not mentioned as one 
of the variables in the IEP publication on global terrorism. 
However, I would predict that like the other characteristics of 
terrorist states such as gender inequality, poor access to health 
policy care, high government corruption, poor economic 
development, and poverty, there are so many low terrorist 
countries that also have these characteristics, that having a 
youth bulge would also not be significantly correlated with 
terrorist activities. 
One of the most significant correlates of terrorism cited 
above was intergroup cohesion, and this refers to the relations 
of cooperation and respect between members of various 
identity groups within a society. This suggests that people in 
terrorist states have little tolerance and support for human 
rights of those who are not in their own identity group. In 
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this regard the work of Inglehart and Welzel15 may apply. 
These sociologists analyzed data from the European and 
World Values Surveys over decades. In their theory, positive 
development is a process characterized by economic growth, 
rising levels of education and information, and diversification 
of human interactions. They further state that when groups 
in a society have their basic economic and health needs met, 
then progress can be made in support of tolerance of different 
groups and their human rights. In their theory, it is difficult 
for people to support those outside their own group when 
they need to focus on their own difficult survival or concern 
about threats from other groups. 
My own bias is that policy-makers should acknowledge the 
need for greater human rights education and application of 
human rights approaches to interventions. One important 
principle of human rights approaches is meaningful 
participation by all people affected by a given program. 
Other elements of rights-based programs are that they should 
be empowering; processes and outcomes need evaluation; 
programs should focus on marginalized and disadvantaged 
groups; measurable goals and indicators need to be identified; 
and accountability of all participants and administrators 
need to be examined.16 The task for peace-makers and 
aid organizations is to acknowledge the many factors that 
lead to terrorism and to understand social contexts when 
planning interventions. For health policy-makers, becoming 
knowledgeable about the burgeoning global support for 
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